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Cybersecurity and the auto industry: the growing challenges 








The term “connected cars” embraces all private passenger vehicles which are 
connected to the internet in some way. Whilst most modern road vehicles, including 
buses and trucks, are now complex computer-laden devices attached to the “internet 
of things” (IoT), this article concentrates on cars where, arguably, the greatest cyber 
security challenges occur as a consequence of the number of vehicles involved, the 
potential disincentives to invest in cybersecurity, the range of user threats greater and 
overall risks the highest. Despite the magnitude and potential impacts of cybersecurity 
issues, there are very few academic contributions to the debate which focus on the 
wider social, economic and behavioural aspects rather than the technological. This 
article discusses cybersecurity issues with the objective informing the agenda for the 
developing debate and identifying areas for potential action. 
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Introduction 
The automotive industry is built on a foundation of engineering and process rigour. 
However, this professional legacy has established an overriding culture of 
conservatism which is only now beginning to break down as vehicles enter the realm 
of connectivity and cybersecurity. Clark et al. (2014) define cybersecurity as  
 
a globally-interconnected digital information and communications infrastructure that 
supports the functionality of almost every system in the modern world.  
 
Cybersecurity measures are associated with managing risks, patching vulnerabilities 
and improving system resilience. In the context of road vehicles, the (US) National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), defines automotive cybersecurity 
as 
 
the protection of automotive electronic systems, communication networks, control 
algorithms, software, users and underlying data from malicious attacks, damage, 
unauthorised access, or manipulation.  
 
Vehicle development is continually evolving from familiar mechanical systems to 
electromechanical constructs with highly integrated hardware and software 
subsystems forming in-vehicle computer networks (Checkoway et al., 2011), which 
are, in turn, connected to an expanding array of other networks. OEMs are beginning 
to contemplate the strategic shift from being carmakers to becoming mobility service 
providers; modern cars now embody a bundle of services which go beyond 
transportation per se. However, the major auto manufacturers will not be able to deal 
with these shifts by themselves or in their traditional way. Long development cycles, 
incremental change and arms’ length supplier relationships will no longer work.  The 
constant addition of new connected services and features embodying unfamiliar 
technologies will require OEMs to become part of a complex ecosystem of traditional 
suppliers, ICT giants such as Apple and Google, telecoms providers, technology start-
ups, aftermarket service providers and infrastructure designers.  
 
As cars increasingly incorporate in-vehicle computer systems to improve vehicle 
safety, security, comfort and performance, the threat of cybersecurity vulnerabilities 
increases. The creation of a new product in the automobile industry is a complex task, 
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characterised by uncertainty and variability. The rapid development of connected cars 
further emphasises these challenges.  Cooperation of OEMs and their suppliers in the 
form of knowledge sharing is an important aspect in developing cybersecurity 
vulnerability solutions. A compelling reason for focusing on connected cars as a 
category is that cybersecurity issues form a major and increasingly exposed part of the 
current automotive industry agenda and, arguably, present in an extreme form in 
connected cars.  “Extreme” embraces the complexity of the issues, the range of levels 
(individual to global) impacted by cybersecurity failures, the very high costs (social, 
reputational, policing as well as financial) of cybercrime in the sector, the level of 
investment being made by auto manufacturers in smart technology innovations to 
their products, the global structure of the industry, and the highly pervasive and 
mobile nature of the product.  
 
The wider context is set out in the policy document “Cybersecurity Strategy of the 
European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace” (EC, 2013). This firmly 
locates cybersecurity strategy within the EU’s core values. Parallel policy imperatives 
are set out by the US and UK among other countries. Whilst there are no specific 
references to connected cars per se, the overarching principles of ensuring that digital 
interactions are open to all, democratically governed and provided and conducted 
safely in a positive environment of shared responsibility are the guiding principles for 
future action.   
 
The auto industry, in common with many others, for example financial services and 
ICT, is ill-prepared to meet the new challenges. Among the many concerns are weak 
integration of component supply chains in critical electronics areas, poor component 
integration strategies, inadequate understandings of vulnerabilities at component 
interfaces, the secondary attention paid to cybersecurity issues, the lack of incentives 
and mechanisms to share intelligence on cybersecurity breaches and the asymmetric 
advantages enjoyed by cybersecurity attackers over defenders. The business models 
of automotive OEMs will need to evolve and adapt to meet these challenges. In the 
meantime, connected cars might be the site of the perfect cybersecurity storm. 
 
 
A new landscape for the auto industry 
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There are three major areas of development in the auto industry which will result in a 
fundamental reconfiguration of its technological, competitive, regulatory and 
cooperative existence. In broad terms these are the introduction and take-up of new 
engine systems to provide energy to vehicles, notably the spread of EVs, the 
development of autonomous vehicles (AVs) and the enhancement of services 
available to increasingly connected cars. Whilst these avenues of development could 
exist without each other, they have a synergy and interdependency which cannot be 
ignored. The important feature is connectedness. “Connected cars” include 
autonomous (“driverless”) cars and ones employing ADAS, Advanced Driver 
Assistance Systems. Connectedness enables and promotes different degrees and 
dimensions of driving autonomy, rather than the opposite, that is the desire for 
autonomy in vehicles being the stimulus to develop connected cars. The move 
towards connected cars is promoting major realignment within the automotive 
industry (Beiker et al., 2016). Perhaps, for the first time, the key technological 
developments which will drive industry innovation, individual firm competitiveness 
and consumer choice lie outside the ambit of automotive manufacturers’ core 
historical competencies.  
 
The potential costs of vehicle cybersecurity attacks and their prevention measures 
need to be weighed up against the undoubted benefits which technological benefits in 
connected cars may bring. A useful way of viewing connected cars is to see them as a 
collection of functionality bundles. These build on the familiar bundle of transport 
services to add driver assistance, passenger safety, vehicle security, improved 
mobility, entertainment, office and communication services, navigation and so on. 
The inclusion of software in automotive design architectures has paved the way for 
improving the driving experience and everyday life (Charette, 2009; Onishi, 2012). In 
very brief terms connected car positives include 
 
 Improved safety through better road infrastructure, on-board safety systems, 
automatic “Smart SOS” emergency services’ calling (for example, eCall) 
 Improved vehicle security through more sophisticated access systems 
 Better use of road infrastructure to reduce congestion, enable smart parking, 
and spread journeys through time 
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 Safer and more accessible driving for those whose driving abilities are 
physically compromised enhancing employment and leisure opportunities 
 Greener driving through reduced emissions 
 User and usage based, including driving style and habits, insurance premiums 
providing an incentive for safer driving 
 Improved vehicle maintenance and reliability  
 The improvement of air quality 
 Opportunities for passengers to use the time spent on car journeys in more 
interesting and/or productive ways 
 More enjoyable car travel 
 Greater competition in the vehicle servicing, updating and repair industry 
resulting in greater consumer choice and potentially lower costs (the “right to 
repair”) 
 Improved payment services for fuel (including e-car battery charging), pay-as-
you-drive insurance, parking charges and other car-related mobility services 
Estimates of the likely number of connected cars abound; about one in five cars on the 
road will have some sort of wireless connection by 2020, that is a quarter of a billion 
vehicles. The value of the 2020 connected car market is estimated at €42bn. The (UK) 
Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, SMMT (2016) estimates that the annual 
economic benefit of connected vehicles to the UK will grow to €65bn by 2030.  A 
study by Telefonica of more than 5,000 people found that 70% were already using or 
would, in the future, use connected car services.  The World Economic Forum 
estimates that the digital transformation of the automotive industry will generate $67 
billion in value for that sector and $3.1 trillion in societal benefits (West, 2016).  
The growing cybersecurity threat 
The automotive industry is facing an increase in the number of cybersecurity 
incidents. In March 2012, over 300,00 touch screens fitted to the Edge, Focus, 
Explorer and Lincoln MKX models malfunctioned, prompting Ford to send out 
software updates installed on flash drives. In July 2015, Fiat Chrysler recalled 1.4 
million vehicles due to concerns about the cars’ software and possible remote 
manipulation. Software coding errors enabled the Nissan Leaf to be hacked via the 
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NissanConnect EV application. The error permitted hackers to remotely control in-car 
systems and view drivers’ identity data.  
 
Connected vehicles house vast amounts of personal data in their in-car networks and 
carry-in devices connected to them. Connected vehicles lack security mechanisms for 
real-time tracking, detection, analysis and mitigation techniques targeting 
cybersecurity incidents. The lack of security mechanisms in in-vehicle networks was 
demonstrated by Koscher et al. (2016) who conducted experiments on two cars within 
a test environment. They demonstrated how to adversarially access and take control of 
a wide range of critical automotive functions and cause them to ignore driver input 
and the means to infiltrate virtually any car Electronic Control Unit (ECU) after 
bypassing their rudimentary network security protections.  
 
Modern connected vehicles now contain over 60 ECUs (Koscher et al. 2010; Studnia 
et al.; 2013; Loukas, 2015). These ECUs are tasked with controlling and monitoring 
the internal car network and its various subsystems interconnected through several 
gateways (Durrani, 2012). Automobile internal networks have historically adopted an 
isolated closed loop structure; the continuing path of software and ECU development 
in automotive manufacture has seen these networks transition to a more open system 
structure. Connected cars are not usefully thought of as “ICT + cars”; the relationship 
is not a simple additive one. Nor are connected cars likely to be just “smarter” 
existing cars or more sophisticated “intelligent cars”, although they will embody 
many features of them. Connected cars are fully-fledged nodes on the “Internet of 
Things” (IoT), that is the web of physical objects, including cars, embedded with 
electronics, software, sensors, and network connectivity that enables them to collect 
and exchange data. Connected cars consume, create, supplement, direct and share 
digital information with other vehicles, transport infrastructure (Kleberger et al., 
2011) and a host of other physical devices. Cars become entertainment centres, 
communications hubs, mobile offices, learning spaces, virtual shopping malls and 
whatever else our collective imaginations can dream up.  But cars cannot be seen 
simply as “things”; they are prized possessions, highly mobile, dangerous in the 
wrong hands or at the wrong time, and potentially very attractive targets for a wide 
variety of criminal activity, increasingly including cybercrime. 
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Vehicular evolution ushered in by computerised control has paved the way to an array 
of potential cybersecurity incidents. Increased vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) 
connectivity through infotainment, navigation and telematics systems dramatically 
increases the risk of security breaches (Checkoway et al., 2011; Weimerskirch et al., 
2012). In addition, the deployment of highly sophisticated software increases the 
potential for coding errors and software defects (Onishi, 2012; Trim et al., 2014).  
Research has been aimed at identifying different attack vectors with the capability of 
compromising connected vehicles and exposing their networks. Areas covered 
include infotainment, telematics, on-board diagnostics, in-vehicle communication 
protocols (Koscher et al., 2010; Hoppe et al., 2011).  Researchers have identified and 
documented numerous vulnerabilities in connected cars, for example remote 
exploitation of in-car systems (Miller et al., 2014), vehicle sabotage, electronic 
tuning, theft and car viruses (Nilsson, 2008; Studnia et al., 2013). However, little 
research effort has been directed towards the creation of an infrastructure for 
collecting, processing, and managing cybersecurity incident data that can be used to 
develop cybersecurity incident management strategies.  
 
One special area of concern is the rise of V2G (vehicle to grid) technology, that is, the 
integration of EVs into “smart” electric grids. By using V2G technologies, utility 
providers can let electricity flow from car batteries to power lines and back, creating a 
new market for utility companies and savings on home electricity bills for EV owners. 
However, there are fears that malevolent hackers or terrorists could inflict substantial 
damage to either the electrical grid or in the transportation infrastructure through use 
of unforeseen security holes. As a recent commentator suggested: 
 
a malicious attack on the electric vehicle cyber infrastructure could potentially result 
in brownouts or stranded vehicles, and any failure in smart charging systems could 
strike a huge blow to utilities as well as consumer confidence in the reliability and 
viability of electric vehicles as a preferred mode of transportation (Pike Research, 
2013). 
 
The development of vehicle-to-cloud-to-everything networks results in even greater 
potential vulnerabilities. These challenges not only affect auto designers, developers 
and producers, but also have major repercussions for other sectors, for example the 
insurance industry and regulatory bodies. Even though modern cars are pervasively 
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computerized and open to remote compromise from many attack vectors (Checkoway 
et al., 2011), the protection of automotive control systems against manipulation has 
only very recently prompted major concern.  
 
Developing issues 
Software  complexity 
Complexity entails non-linearity. It is important to distinguish between complex 
systems and complicated systems. Complicated systems may have high dynamism 
and convoluted behaviour patterns, but they still exhibit linearity and causal 
consistency. Complex cybersecurity systems do neither. Non-linearity means that 
technical and human behavioural influences on cybersecurity issues cannot be 
separated. Cyber systems, given their high degree of non-linearity and variability in 
actor behaviour, cannot be explained or threats measured in traditional risk theory 
terms. It is likely that cybersecurity decision makers are under-equipped to gauge the 
magnitude and form of threats. 
 
A major challenge is thus developing given the growing complexity of the software 
code in use. With most of this code still being hand-written, despite there being tools 
that can be used to generate complex code, the probability of errors in code is high 
(Axelrod et al., 2014). With most of the coding carried out by suppliers, integration 
issues arise and expose some systems to remote exploitation (Checkoway et al., 2011; 
Thomas et al., 2013; Amin et al., 2015). Coding errors may, in part, be attributable to 
the shortage of personnel with the required skills and expertise (Assante et al., 2011; 
Axelrod et al. 2014).  
 
Advances in artificial intelligence (software that applies advanced computing to 
problem-solving) and deep learning (software analytics that learn from experience) 
allow on-board computers connected to cloud processing platforms to integrate data 
instantly. With the emergence of 5G networks and the Internet of Things, these trends 
are firmly embedded in the new era of vehicle development. Advanced software 
enables cars to learn from the experiences of other vehicles and adjust their guidance 
systems as weather, driving or road conditions shift. On-board systems can learn from 
other vehicles on the road through machine-to-machine 
communications. Autonomous cars depend on vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) 
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communications and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) connections. It is crucial to 
maintain security in each of these pathways as well as in the personal electronic 
communications that passengers transmit via email, phone calls, texting, Internet 
surfing, and location data. “Cyber-presence” is generally shaped by the interaction 
between software developers, system architects and engineers, managerial initiatives, 
partners in the industry ecosystem and end-users. Delimiting the “cyber perimeter”, 
and therefore policing it,  can be difficult, as vulnerabilities can emerge from sources 
which are conventionally outside the organisation’s familiar visibility span. 
Inadequate infrastructure 
Infrastructure problems plague many countries. In India, for example, highways and 
roads represent a major challenge. Nearly 38 percent of the country’s roads are 
unpaved, compared to about 16 percent in China. Poor highways pose challenges for 
autonomous vehicles. Such cars need predictable surfaces and clearly defined traffic 
lanes. To the extent that roads are poorly marked or engineered, it is difficult for 
either semi-autonomous or fully-autonomous vehicles to traverse such routes. The 
risk of accidents increases and there is a grave danger that computerized algorithms 
will lead to poor decisions.  
Inadequate spectrum availability is a major barrier in many countries. Finding 
dedicated frequency ranges is key to supporting connected cars. They need specific 
bands that perform well regardless of weather or traffic conditions. In practice this 
means mid-range spectrum below 6 GHz to achieve a workable balance between 
connection speed and reliability. Demand and competition for such frequencies is 
high and current capacity is unable to satisfy the additional demands generated by a 
widespread adoption of AVs. 
Talent shortages 
A lack of skilled cybersecurity professionals has contributed to the growth of 
cybersecurity incidents. Trim et al. (2014) highlight the lack of skilled cybersecurity 
professionals including managers with the ability and awareness to understand the 
technical gaps and the human deficiencies. Assante et al. (2011) point out that 
cybersecurity attackers and defenders are people and successful cybersecurity 
solutions require talent identification and recruitment, and continued development and 
conditioning of security professionals.  Identifying and developing talent to address 
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the cybersecurity human resource deficit has become a priority for governments, 
higher education and many other organisations (Assante et al., 2011; Axelrod et al., 
2014; Dark et al., 2015).  
 
Weak or ineffective recruitment and training methods have also contributed to the 
constantly depleting supply of skilled cyber-aware professionals.  Axelrod et al. 
(2014) argue that a lack of skilled cybersecurity experts is encouraged by some 
academic processes. IT security firm Cybrary indicated in 2015 that there is a global 
shortage of skilled cybersecurity professionals and this could be one of the reasons 
that has contributed to the rise of cybersecurity incidents in connected vehicles 
(Cybrary, 2015). Their survey of 435 senior technology professionals revealed some 
of the obstacles that most employers encounter in employing skilled cybersecurity 
personnel. The reasons given by 80% of respondents included lack of skilled 
cybersecurity talent, limited resources to locate and entice suitable talent, lack of 
certification and professional standards and salary levels. There is a very high demand 
for personnel with cybersecurity skills that greatly out-weighs supply in most 
industrial sectors and not just the automotive industry. The ability of IT professionals 
has been outpaced by sophisticated technology and tactics employed by criminals 
rendering cybersecurity a major business problem as well as a technical one. 
 
Supply network configurations 
Traditionally, OEMs focused on stability and performance of their supply chains, 
increasingly devising means to maintain and gain a competitive edge within the 
sector. ICT driven transformation, technological developments, component out-
sourcing, the growing influences of cybersecurity, increased customer demand, 
proliferation of models and model variants have collectively induced far-reaching 
changes in the automotive supply chain. The new competitive forces faced by the 
industry render the simple tiered structure unsuitable. Growing software system 
complexity and highly integrated IT sub-systems have paved the way for the 
emergence of new suppliers. The new entrants provide services, particularly in design 
and engineering, rather than physical products (Loukas, 2015). These firms have a 
huge global presence and have located local plants close to OEMs forming supplier 
parks, taking responsibility for designing and assembling whole modules or systems 
of a vehicle. However, physical proximity of major suppliers and OEMs may have 
 11 
fewer benefits where the “components” being supplied take the form of computer 
software and associated hardware. 
 
Rather than thinking of major critical suppliers as being in Tier 1, it is helpful to 
identify them in terms of their new roles. System integrators have sophisticated 
capabilities in design and component integration. They integrate sub-systems into 
complete system modules prior to being shipped directly to the OEMs.  Most 
automotive manufacturers place design and development responsibilities for systems, 
sub-systems, multi-technology products and components on system integrators (Amin 
et al. 2015) reflecting the relative unfamiliarity of the new technologies embodied in 
connected cars to incumbent OEMs. Global standardisers, a subset of system 
integrators, set the standards for a component or system on a global basis. These 
companies are capable of designing, developing and manufacturing complex systems 
or multi-technology products. 
 
System manufacturers design systems and components from functional specifications 
and performance factors provided by automotive OEMs; however, at times, system 
manufacturers make design decisions without OEM input. System manufacturers 
supply components to the system integrators or directly to the OEMs. Component 
specialists design and manufacturer specific components or sub-systems for a given 
car or platform. These companies are often suppliers to system integrators and system 
manufacturers. They design systems and multi-technology products from functional 
specifications and performance factors provided by OEMs.  
 
Complex digital systems and sub-systems are manufactured by a plethora of globally 
dispersed suppliers within the supply network. This multi-supplier structure permits 
design and development outsourcing, reduces development lead times, improves 
responses to strict deadlines, enables product proliferation at lower cost and 
encourages the production of quality products. However, it also creates knowledge-
sharing challenges and may reduce the participation of OEMs in the design and 
development of vital components, software systems and multi-technology products. 
Yet, it is still OEMs who are responsible for the safety, quality and security of the 
products which bear their name. 
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Information and cost asymmetries 
Cybersecurity is a secondary task within most business models; it provides limited 
opportunities for monetisation and value creation in a highly profit-oriented market 
environment. This results in security thinking being framed as a secondary function in 
many automotive OEMs and their major suppliers. 
 
Informational asymmetry between attackers and defenders embodies an advantage to 
attackers. The adversarial macro-dynamics of the contested cybersecurity relationship 
are shared with all competitive strategy; however, the role of information is distinct in 
cybersecurity as breaches generally rely on an information imbalance. Attackers aim 
to get advantageous information on potential vulnerabilities and the appeal of 
different targets; defence entails anticipation of possible, or at least likely, threats. 
This asymmetry is amplified by the opportunity for attackers to empirically validate 
their assumptions and dedicate their full energies to finding attack vectors. In 
addition, the costs of unsuccessful attacks are generally low, unsuccessful defence can 
result in major disruption and challenges to operational sustainability. The link 
between knowledge information limitations and the ineffectiveness of many 
cybersecurity defence techniques results in an overuse of intuition, reliance on static 
and generic knowledge and inadequate cyber presence governance (Julisch, 2013). 
 
The human “component” 
In generic terms, many of the main cybersecurity threats facing us today derive not 
from ICTs themselves but from human error. As a major consultancy firm expressed 
it: 
Cyber security isn’t just about technology, it’s also about psychology and sociology. 
It’s easy for engineers to believe that the most important solution is the thing with the 
most flashing lights, but in the world of cyber security, it’s often the behaviour of 
people that actually determines the outcome (PWC, 2014). 
 
The most serious cybersecurity breaches are the product of multiple failings in people, 
processes, procedures and technology. In the haste to adopt and exploit new 
technology for the potential benefit of us all, there can be a tendency to overlook the 
inherent risks and underestimate and, consequently, effectively manage the downside 
through effective security measures. Users can be the source of cybersecurity risks 
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through, for example, V2D interactions, such as using smartphones as the interface of 
choice to connected car technology. The potential need for, and costs of, user 
education to help prevent cybersecurity breaches in connected cars remains 
unexplored except for some pioneering work in the autonomous vehicle sector 
(Center for Automotive Research, 2016).  
 
Possible responses 
Existing approaches to ensuring cybersecurity in connected cars are inadequate 
(Bordonali et al., 2017). Cybersecurity knowledge sharing efforts between OEMs 
have been focused on providing security for communication systems and user data. 
This has led to several attempts to create alliances between OEMs in a bid to swap 
cybersecurity data and to keep abreast of the latest hacking threats targeting 
connected vehicles. For example, the (US) AAM (Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers), an industry trade and advocacy group comprising twelve of the major 
global OEMs, has created the ISAC (Information Sharing and Analysis Centre). ISAC 
data is available for automakers worldwide; however, the lack of economic incentives 
to participate and share effective and useful information has limited its success 
(Vanian, 2015).  
 
The automotive industry can, and must, learn from the computing domain where 
standards and initiatives have developed to facilitate cybersecurity information and 
knowledge sharing, but in the knowledge that the computing domain itself is 
struggling to come to grips with cybersecurity vulnerabilities.  One cause is the 
complexity inherent in warding off attacks that are continually being adapted and 
evolved to exploit system weaknesses, especially given that such weaknesses are 
often caused by careless design and integration flaws. Dandurand et al. (2013) argue 
that there is a strong requirement for improved information sharing and automation in 
the cybersecurity domain. Brown (2015) notes the fundamental barriers exist in the 
field of cybersecurity information sharing, such as those raised in protecting privacy 
and a legal regime inherited from a pre-cybersecurity era, which require further 
research.  
 
Different economic tools, both qualitative and quantitative, embody different 
cybersecurity representations. Tools based on economic knowledge can highlight 
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cybersecurity’s operational aspects and provide a valuable input into developing 
effective policy. Economic tools link the development and operation of technologies 
and inform decision-making processes across a wide spectrum. Combining social, 
technical, organisational and economic aspects of cybersecurity highlights the 
economics that shape cyberspace and vice versa. Cyberactors, including consumers, 
providers and public agencies, have different responsibilities and exposures to 
emerging threats. Economic insights help us to understand how different actors are 
positioned in cyberspace. Given the secondary role of cybersecurity in organisations’ 
value creation, cybersecurity performance relies on the local manifestation of threats, 
the organisations’ adaptive capacity and system learning, as well as on its ability to 
develop, sustain and adapt inferential procedures, and act on the resulting insights. 
 
The growth and success of damaging cybersecurity incidents is promoted by the lack 
of research evidence to inform the development of technology regulations, policies 
and profit structures. It follows that, to mitigate the threat of cybersecurity, 
coordinated research and development strategies must be developed. Axelrod et al. 
(2014) contend that cross-disciplinary research in implementing security into control 
systems will be needed to provide the solutions necessary to combat cybersecurity 
incidents.  
 
Connected cars contain multiple embedded software products developed by different 
development teams with different skill-sets, processes and tools. Software is present 
in most if not all vehicle components (Loukas, 2015). Each software sub-system or 
system is unique and offers distinct coding and integration challenges. Integration of 
software modules adds to the huge challenge that vehicle manufacturers face in 
integrating different suppliers into an automotive supply chain that ensures security 
and reliability.  
 
Summary 
Connected cars are embedded in a complex ecosystem, some elements of which can 
only be changed very slowly, including user behaviour. Ever more sophisticated 
cyber-security threats are emerging and cyber-criminals are learning fast. Cyber 




Despite the prominence of cybersecurity, on the one hand, as a growing and urgent 
issue, and the all-pervasive shift to connected cars, there is little research which 
combines the two areas of interest. The auto industry research agenda, largely 
resourced by the industry itself and often conducted by industry-related bodies, tends 
to stress the benefits of connected cars; cybersecurity issues are only just beginning to 
be given prominence. Cybersecurity research, and the literature on cybercrime, tends 
to stress costs and the negative impacts and there is relatively little work which relates 
to connected cars specifically. Discussions of cybersecurity threats, by their nature, 
tend to downplay the major benefits which ICT can bring to car users individually and 
collectively. There is a major research gap to be filled. 
 
This paper takes a broad view of the cybersecurity challenges contingent on the 
development of connected cars. These challenges are economic, regulatory, industrial 
and infrastructural – and that is just a summary starting list. The existence of a major 
legacy of older (“unconnected”) cars coupled with a road infrastructure built for them; 
the tension between the need for knowledge sharing across a wide variety of actors 
and the disincentives to reveal vulnerabilities and cybersecurity breaches; and the 
potential doubts about driver acceptance of new technologies and willingness to pay 
for them, are also considered. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the phenomenon does 
not encourage an already secretive industry to share information. The automotive 
industry, which is competing within resource constraints, a multitude of players in the 
supply chain, and insufficient cryptographic knowledge, requirements for additional 
hardware infrastructures, considerable processing delays and extra costs is still 
waking up to the emergence of cybersecurity incidents. There is a lack of 
understanding across the automotive industry as to how OEMs should detect and 
respond to cybersecurity incidents in connected vehicles. OEMs need a mechanism 
that allows them to respond to all forms of cybersecurity incidents in connected cars, 
a mechanism that informs mitigation measures that can be implemented.  
 
The undoubted potential of ICT to be exploited for good and, on the other hand, the 
vulnerabilities to critical infrastructures and digital services which may result in 
significant negative impacts on society, need to be managed. These challenges cross 
all sectors, manifest themselves at all levels from the individual to the global, emerge 
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and mutate very rapidly and, in many cases, are still largely unknowable.  And they 
are not only technical; as with all major changes driven by technological 
development, those promoted by ICT bring social, political, business and economic 
shifts which affect us all, now and in the future.  In turn ICT-driven transformations 
can only be fully understood and harnessed for the undoubted benefits they can bring, 
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